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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
00O00 
State of Utah, No, 940558 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
F I L E D 
James Fred Gordon, 
Defendant and Appellant. March 11, 1996 
First District, Box Elder County 
The Honorable Ben H. Hadfield 
Attorneys: Jan Graham, Att'y Gen., Todd A. Utzinger, Asst. 
Att'y Gen., Salt Lake City, for plaintiff 
Kent E. Snider, Michael D. Bowhuis, Ogden, for 
defendant 
HOWE, Justice: 
Defendant appeals from a conviction for possession of a 
controlled substance with intent to distribute, a second degree 
felony. Pursuant to rule 43 of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, the court of appeals certified the case to this court. 
I. FACTS 
On appeal from a jury verdict, we view the evidence and 
all reasonable inferences in a light most favorable to that 
verdict and recite the facts accordingly. Cornia v. Wilcox, 898 
P.2d 1379, 1382 (Utah 1995); State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1205-
06 (Utah 1993). On December 17, 1982, defendant James Fred 
Gordon was staying at the Brigham City apartment of his ex-wife, 
Ann Marie Frigon, as he occasionally did after their divorce six 
years earlier. That day, Frigon was ^shocked" to learn that she 
was pregnant with Gordon's child. At about six or seven o'clock 
that evening, Gordon left the apartment, telling Frigon that he 
would be back in five minutes. Instead, he went to a bar and 
then to a friend's house, returning to the apartment about six 
o'clock the next morning. Frigon was angry with Gordon, 
especially after smelling his shirt, which ^reeked of cologne," 
as she imagined that he had been with another woman. The two 
argued briefly before Gordon went to sleep. 
A few hours later, Frigon found a plastic bag 
containing the drug lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD). She called 
the Brigham City Police Department and reported that Gordon was 
at her apartment and that he had some drugs. She met two 
officers outside her apartment and told them that there was LSD 
inside. Frigon explained that she knew it was LSD because Gordon 
had told her so and because she had seen him with LSD before. 
She stated that the LSD had fallen out of his coat pocket onto 
the floor and that she was afraid her young child might find and 
possibly eat it. Frigon gave the officers permission to enter 
her apartment to get the drugs. 
Once inside the apartment, Frigon opened a closet and 
showed them the plastic bag protruding from a coat pocket. The 
bag contained a piece of graph paper with a unicorn design on it. 
Each square on the graph paper contained one dose or "hit" of 
LSD, and there were approximately sixty-five to seventy "hits" 
remaining on the paper. 
The officers awoke Gordon and asked him to accompany 
them to the police station. He agreed and, while dressing, was 
advised of his Miranda rights. He asked the officers why they 
wanted to talk to him. They told him about the LSD in his coat 
pocket. Gordon responded, "Well, I know you've got me. What's 
the punishment for that?" One of the officers told Gordon he did 
not know what charges he would face. Gordon asked Frigon if she 
had told the police about the drugs. When she remained silent, 
he asked her why. She responded, "Well, because I wanted to 
protect my family." 
At the police station, an officer read Gordon a written 
consent form explaining his Miranda rights which Gordon signed. 
Gordon admitted that the LSD was his. He explained that he had 
obtained it from someone in Salt Lake City, but he refused to 
identify the person. He said he did not intend to sell it. 
An officer then called the county attorney to ask what 
charges should be filed. Due to the large number of doses of 
LSD, the county attorney told the officer to charge Gordon with 
possession with intent to distribute, a second degree felony. 
The officer told Gordon about the charges and possible penalties 
were he to be convicted. The officers then asked him if he would 
give them a written or taped statement. He refused and said he 
would no longer talk with them until he had spoken to an 
attorney. 
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II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
The procedural history of this case is rather complex, 
but it is relevant in analyzing the merits of Gordon's appeal. 
At Gordon's first appearance at the circuit court in Brigham 
City, Box Elder County, the judge found him to be indigent and 
appointed attorney Clinton S. Judkins to represent him. 
Unbeknownst to Gordon, at that time Judkins was a part-time 
prosecutor for the city of Tremonton, also located in Box Elder 
County. Following a jury trial on April 26, 1983, Gordon was 
convicted of the charged offense and later sentenced to a term of 
one to fifteen years in the Utah State Prison. 
Judkins, on Gordon's behalf, filed a timely notice of 
appeal. Later, Judkins filed a motion for a new trial based on 
newly discovered evidence, but the trial court denied the motion 
as untimely. In October 1983, the appeal was dismissed for 
failure to prosecute. 
In July 1992, nearly nine years later, Gordon filed a 
motion in the trial court to be resentenced nunc pro tunc1 
because of his attorney's failure to prosecute his appeal. He 
contended that his constitutional right to an appeal was denied 
because Judkins had failed to pursue the appeal due to his 
conflict of interest as a city prosecutor. The court denied the 
motion as untimely and not supported "with sufficient affidavits 
or memoranda as required by law." 
In January 1993, Gordon petitioned for a writ of 
postconviction relief. After an evidentiary hearing, the court 
denied the petition. In doing so, the court examined the 
retroactivity of State v. Brown, 853 P.2d 851, 857-59 (Utah 
1992), in which we announced a prohibition against the 
appointment of attorneys with concurrent prosecutorial duties to 
represent indigent criminal defendants and a per se rule of 
reversal in such cases. The court concluded that Brown was not 
intended to be applied retroactively. Gordon appealed from that 
decision to this court. 
1
 Nunc pro tunc "applie[s] to acts allowed to be done after 
the time when they should be done . . . with the same effect as 
if regularly done." Black's Law Dictionary 964 (5th ed. 1979); 
see also State v. Johnson, 635 P.2d 36, 38 n.l (Utah 1981) ("Nunc 
pro tunc, which means *now for then,' is probably a misnomer for 
this circumstance, where the court is resentencing to give the 
judgment of conviction not retroactive but present effect—%then 
for now.'"). 
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Without conducting plenary review of Gordon's claims, 
we issued a September 24, 1993 order stating in its entirety: 
Having decided that Gordon was denied 
his constitutional right to appeal, this 
court remands the case to the trial court for 
resentencing, so that Gordon may raise the 
issues here presented in a first appeal as of 
right. State v. Hallett, [856 P.2d 1060, 
1062 n.2 (Utah 1993)], noting proper 
resentencing procedure outlined in State v. 
Johnson, 635 P.2d 36, 38 (Utah 1981)[,] is 
under coram vobis through rule 65B(b), 
formerly rule 65B(i), of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. 
The trial court is directed to have 
counsel on appeal appointed for defendant. 
On remand, the trial court resentenced Gordon nunc pro tunc to 
the same term as it had originally, one to fifteen years. 
With new counsel, Gordon filed a motion for a new trial 
based upon (1) ineffective assistance of trial counsel because of 
his appointed defense counsel's concurrent position as a city 
prosecutor, and (2) newly discovered evidence in the form of a 
new witness, Danny Burke, one of Gordon's fellow inmates, who 
allegedly stated in 1983 that he was the owner of the drugs, that 
he had left them at Frigon's apartment, and that Gordon had no 
knowledge of the drugs for which he was charged.2 After a 
hearing, the trial court denied the motion on the grounds that 
the case was remanded for the sole purpose of resentencing Gordon 
and that consideration of the motion was beyond the authority 
granted to the court. Furthermore, the court denied the motion 
on the merits, holding that (1) the prohibition against city 
attorneys representing criminal defendants was not retroactive, 
and (2) Gordon's "proffered affidavit of Danny Burke (a fellow 
inmate) appears to be of dubious value." 
Gordon appealed to the court of appeals from his 1983 
conviction and resentencing and from the denial of his motion for 
a new trial. Pursuant to rule 43 of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, the court of appeals certified the case to this court 
to resolve the issue of whether the prohibition in Brown should 
be applied retroactively. 
2
 No affidavit of Mr. Burke was attached to the motion, and 
there is no copy of it in the record, j 
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III. ANALYSIS 
A. Retroactivity of State v. Brown 
In Brown, the defendant was represented by appointed 
counsel who was also a part-time city prosecutor. Brown, 853 
P.2d at 856. He was convicted of second degree murder and 
aggravated assault. Id, at 852. On appeal, he contended that he 
was denied due process and the effective assistance of counsel 
when the court appointed a city prosecutor as his trial counsel. 
We agreed and reversed, holding: 
Although we do not decide whether it is 
constitutionally impermissible to appoint a 
city attorney with prosecutorial 
responsibilities to represent an indigent 
defendant, we conclude that vital interests 
of the criminal justice system are 
jeopardized when [it occurs]. Consequently, 
we hold that as a matter of public policy and 
pursuant to our inherent supervisory power 
over the courts, as well as our express power 
to govern the practice of law, counsel with 
concurrent prosecutorial obligations may not 
be appointed to defend indigent persons 
. . . [W]e announce a per se rule of 
reversal wherever such dual representation is 
undertaken so as to prevent its recurrence. 
Id. at 856-57, 859 (emphasis in original). 
Initially Gordon contends that by ordering his 
resentencing, this court ^explicitly recognized that the 
prohibition against a part-time city prosecutor serving as an 
appointed defense attorney is applicable to Defendant's case." 
Gordon reads far too much into our order, which merely stated, 
^Having decided that Gordon was denied his constitutional right 
to appeal, this court remands the case to the trial court for 
resentencing, so that Gordon may raise the issues here presented 
in a first appeal as of right." The order clearly did not 
address the merits of Gordon's conflict-of-interest argument. It 
did not mention Brown or discuss its retroactivity. Rather, it 
merely required Gordon to be resentenced so that he could raise 
the argument on appeal. 
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Next, Gordon asserts that our decision in Brown 
entitles him to a new trial. Brown was expressly decided as a 
matter of public policy under our inherent supervisory power over 
the courts and our power to govern the practice of law, which 
powers are well settled. Brown, 853 P.2d at 857; see State v. 
Carter, 888 P.2d 629, €50 n.32 (Utah) (and cases cited therein), 
cert- denied, U.S. , 116 S. Ct. 163, 133 L. Ed. 2d 105 
(1995) . When we base a decision upon our supervisory power over 
lower courts, it is a clear indication that the decision will 
apply only to future cases. State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 407 
n.7 (Utah 1994) (*[T]he invocation of our supervisory powers 
. . . demonstrates a commitment on the part of this court to 
prospectively prohibit the use of the offending language [in the 
jury instruction at issue]." (emphasis added)), cert, denied, 
U.S. , 115 S. Ct. 910, 130 L. Ed. 2d 792 (1995). 
Furthermore, our decision in Brown announced for the 
first time that counsel with concurrent prosecutorial duties 
could not represent indigent defendants, a clear change from past 
procedures. We have previously held that when a new rule 
governing criminal procedure constitutes a clear break with the 
past, it is not generally applied retroactively. State v. Hoff, 
814 P.2d 1119, 1123 (Utah 1991) (declining to retroactively apply 
strict compliance of rule in taking of guilty pleas); Andrews v. 
Morris, 677 P.2d 81, 95 (Utah 1983) (declining to retroactively 
apply reasonable doubt standard of proof in sentencing defendant 
convicted of capital offense); see also State v. Long, 721 P.2d 
483, 492 (Utah 1986) ("from this date forward," defendants are 
entitled to cautionary instruction regarding eyewitness testimony 
when that testimony is a central issue). 
In Brown, we expressly declined to decide whether the 
appointment of attorneys with concurrent prosecutorial duties was 
constitutionally impermissible. Brown, 853 P.2d at 856. 
However, even where we have adopted a new rule that is of a 
constitutional dimension, we have been reluctant to give it 
retroactive effect. See, e.g., Neel v. Holden, 886 P.2d 1097, 
1103-05 (Utah 1994) (due process affords inmates disclosure of 
contents of their files, including psychological reports, prior 
to parole hearing; decision to apply prospectively only); Labrum 
v. Utah State Bd. of Pardons, 870 P.2d 902, 913-14 (Utah 1993); 
Andrews, 677 P.2d at 88. 
Other reasons favor only prospective application of 
Brown. The primary purpose of the prohibition in Brown was 
clearly prophylactic, that is, to forbid *such dual 
representation • . . so as to prevent its recurrence." 853 P.2d 
at 859 (emphasis added). Applying Brown retroactively would 
unjustly benefit many defendants who received competent, 
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effective assistance of counsel, despite their counsel's 
concurrent prosecutorial duties. Finally, the goal of 
maintaining the efficient administration of justice also strongly 
favors the prospective application of Brown, See Labrum, 870 
P.2d at 912; Andrews, 677 P.2d at 91 (both examining these 
factors on collateral review in deciding against retroactivity). 
Having concluded that the prohibition in Brown should 
be applied only prospectively, we must determine whether on this 
direct appeal, Gordon is nevertheless entitled to benefit from 
its holding. In Menzies, one year after the defendant was 
convicted, we disapproved of a ^reasonable doubt" jury 
instruction in another case. 889 P.2d at 407 n.7. On appeal, 
Menzies argued that he was entitled to benefit from the new case. 
We concluded that our invocation of supervisory powers "is a 
clear indication that we would strike down only future verdicts 
based on the offending [jury instruction]." Id. (emphasis in 
original). Thus, under Menzies, when under our supervisory 
powers we articulate a new cautionary policy, the defendants on 
appeal will not benefit from the new policy. Similarly, in Hoff 
we held that the defendant on appeal did not benefit from State 
v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309, 1312 (Utah 1987), which mandated 
strict compliance with the rule governing the taking of guilty 
pleas. 814 P.2d at 1122. We concluded that Gibbons applied only 
to guilty pleas taken after its issuance. Id. at 1124. 
Likewise, we consistently limited the benefit of the cautionary 
instruction on eyewitness identifications that we mandated in 
State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483, 492 (Utah 1986), to cases tried 
after its date of issuance. See State v. Griffiths, 752 P.2d 
879, 881 n.3 (Utah 1988); State v. Branch, 743 P.2d 1187, 1190 
(Utah 1987), cert, denied, 485 U.S. 1036 (1988); State v. 
Suniville, 741 P.2d 961, 965 (Utah 1987); State v. Jonas, 725 
P.2d 1378, 1380 (Utah 1986). We did so because we decided Long 
under our supervisory powers, despite our concern that a 
conviction without such an instruction *could well deny the 
defendant due process of law under article I, section 7 of the 
Utah Constitution." Long, 721 P.2d at 492. 
We note that in two cases involving constitutional 
issues, we applied prior holdings to claims pending in the 
district court and to those on appeal. See State v. Taysom, 886 
P.2d 513, 513 n.3 (Utah 1994) (addressing authority of court 
commissioners); Labrum v. Utah State Bd. of Pardons, 870 P.2d 
902, 913-14 (holding that inmates have due process right to 
review information considered by parole board). However, these 
cases do not apply here. In Brown, we merely articulated a new 
cautionary policy under our supervisory powers. We conclude that 
Gordon does not benefit from the prohibition in Brown since his 
1983 trial occurred well before we issued Brown in 1992. 
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Justice Stewart's dissent, joined by Justice Durham, 
states that Brown "implicated a defendant's Sixth Amendment right 
to counsel" and that "the issues underlying Brown are of a 
constitutional nature." Yet the Brown opinion, authored just 
three years ago by Justice Durham and joined by Justice Stewart 
(writing a concurring opinion on another issue), examined the 
conflict of interest question at length and concluded: 
[W]e do not decide whether it is 
constitutionally impermissible to appoint a 
city attorney with prosecutorial 
responsibilities to represent an indigent 
defendant. . . . [W]e hold that as a matter 
of public policy and pursuant to our inherent 
supervisory power over the courts, as well as 
our express power to govern the practice of 
law, counsel with concurrent prosecutorial 
obligations may not be appointed to defend 
indigent persons . . . . 
Brown, 853 P.2d at 856-57 (emphasis in original). The dissent 
would now apparently reverse Gordon's 1983 conviction because of 
his constitutional right to have trial counsel who did not have 
concurrent prosecutorial duties, even absent a showing of 
prejudice. We had the clear opportunity to enunciate such a 
holding in Brown but expressly refused to do so. We should not 
do so now. 
The dissent relies upon cases in which the conflict of 
interest arose out of joint representation of multiple 
defendants, where, for example, one codefendant elected to plead 
guilty and testify against the other. See State v. Smith, 621 
P.2d 697, 699 (Utah 1980). This represents a direct conflict of 
interest. However, the conflict of interest faced by an 
appointed defense counsel who also has concurrent prosecutorial 
duties in another jurisdiction is much more remote. Here, where 
Gordon was convicted in a trial conducted before we issued Brown, 
we should require Gordon to show ineffective assistance of his 
defense counsel. 
B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 
Although Gordon is not entitled to a per se reversal 
because of his trial counsel's concurrent prosecutorial duties, 
he is free to contend, and does contend, that he was denied due 
process of law and the effective assistance of counsel as a 
result of his counsel's representation. To demonstrate that his 
defense counsel's assistance was so inadequate as to constitute 
lack of counsel under the Sixth Amendment, Gordon must show that 
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(1) his counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of 
reasonable professional judgment, and (2) he was prejudiced by 
the deficient performance. State v. Lopez, 886 P.2d 1105, 1113-
14 (Utah 1994) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 
690-94, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984)). These factors 
are not applied as a mechanical test but are meant to help us 
answer the ultimate question of whether the "defendant receive[d] 
a fair trial." State v. Frame, 723 P.2d 401, 405 (Utah 1986). 
Gordon contends that his trial counsel failed to 
adequately investigate the possibility that the LSD underlying 
his conviction belonged to another person. At the trial, Frigon 
asserted that a "Mexican" woman named "Cathy" from West Valley 
City and three other people whom she had never met came to her 
apartment at approximately one o'clock the morning Gordon was 
arrested, Cathy allegedly described some LSD that featured a 
unicorn design like that on the LSD stamps police recovered from 
Gordon's coat pocket. The visitors stayed an hour to an hour and 
a half. According to Frigon, when she found the bag containing 
the LSD later that morning, she assumed Cathy had mistakenly left 
it. Frigon testified that because she was angry with Gordon, she 
put the LSD in his coat pocket and called the police to have him 
arrested. Just after Gordon was arrested, Cathy allegedly came 
back to the apartment to reclaim the drugs. It was not until two 
days later that Frigon told the police about Cathy. Gordon 
asserts that his trial counsel failed to investigate whether the 
LSD belonged to Cathy and the other visitors. 
We have held that "a decision not to investigate cannot 
be considered a tactical decision. It is only after an adequate 
inquiry has been made that counsel can make a reasonable decision 
to call or not to call particular witnesses for tactical 
reasons." State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182, 188 (Utah 1990). In 
Tempiin, we held that the defendant, convicted of rape, was 
denied the effective assistance of counsel because his counsel 
did not contact several potential witnesses named by the 
defendant. Id. at 187-88. We reversed his conviction after 
concluding that the witnesses could have bolstered the 
defendant's assertion that the victim was a willing partner in 
the sexual activity, the only issue in contention at trial. Id. 
at 188-89. 
This case is easily distinguishable from Templin 
because Frigon was unable to identify the persons who were 
allegedly in her apartment the morning of Gordon's arrest. She 
testified that she did not know Cathy's last name or the names of 
the other persons. Gordon's trial counsel cannot be faulted for 
failing to contact these unidentified witnesses. 
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Approximately two months after his trial, Gordon filed 
a motion for a new trial in which he submitted the affidavit of a 
fellow inmate at the Utah State Prison named Danny Burke. Burke 
asserted therein that he had been at Frigon's Brigham City 
apartment at approximately eleven o'clock the night before Gordon 
was arrested. He left when Gordon did not return as Frigon 
expected. According to Burke, it was not until he had returned 
to Salt Lake City that he realized he had left his bag of LSD at 
Frigon's apartment. Gordon admitted in his 1994 motion for a new 
trial that Burke's testimony *was unavailable at the time of 
Defendant's trial." That being the case, Gordon's trial counsel 
again cannot be faulted for failing to contact this witness to 
testify at trial. 
Gordon has failed to demonstrate that his counsel's 
performance fell below an objective standard of reasonable 
professional judgment. Therefore, we do not reach the second 
prong of the Strickland test, whether Gordon was prejudiced by 
his counsel's performance. 
C. Motion for a New Trial 
Following this court's September 24, 1993 order 
remanding for resentencing, Gordon filed a motion for a new trial 
based upon (1) ineffective assistance of trial counsel because of 
his appointed defense counsel's concurrent position as a city 
prosecutor, and (2) newly discovered evidence, i.e., the 
testimony of Danny Burke. After a hearing, the trial court 
denied the motion on the grounds that the case was remanded for 
the sole purpose of resentencing Gordon and that consideration of 
the motion was beyond the authority granted to the court. 
Alternatively, the court also denied the motion on the merits. 
Gordon contends that the postconviction motion was 
properly before the trial court. We disagree. The order 
expressly "remand[ed] the case to the trial court for 
resentencing, so that Gordon may raise the issues here presented 
in a first appeal as of right." The only effect of the order was 
to provide Gordon with another opportunity to pursue the direct 
appeal that he was previously denied. In other words, Gordon's 
resentencing merely returned him to the position he was in before 
his appeal was dismissed. It did not allow him another 
opportunity to present postconviction motions. 
I n
 Hallett, cited in our order remanding for 
resentencing, the trial court on postconviction review determined 
that the defendant had been denied his right to appeal. Hallett, 
856 P.2d at 1061. Rather than merely resentencing him so that he 
could pursue an appeal, the trial court proceeded to consider the 
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merits of the other claims raised in the defendant's habeas 
proceeding. Id. at 1062. We held that the trial court erred in 
doing so because its action was contrary to the well-established 
principle that postconviction proceedings are not meant to be 
substitutes for direct appellate review and because it gave the 
defendant an adjudication on the merits to which he was not 
entitled. Id. We held: 
Once a trial court on habeas review 
determines that a defendant has been denied 
the constitutional right to appeal, a direct 
appeal should be provided immediately/ 
without adjudication of any other claims, 
such as ineffective assistance of counsel. 
Id. (emphasis added) . Although in this case it was an appellate 
court on habeas review which determined that Gordon had been 
denied his right to appeal, our holding in Hallett applies here. 
The trial court correctly determined that it was inappropriate to 
adjudicate Gordon's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel 
and newly discovered evidence.3 
We affirm Gordon's conviction. 
Chief Justice Zimmerman and Justice Russon concur in 
Justice Howe's opinion. 
STEWART, Associate Chief Justice, dissenting: 
I dissent. 
The majority holds that appointed defense counsel's 
conflict of interest arising out of his position as a part-time 
city prosecutor is not reversible error although we held such a 
conflict to be per se reversible error in State v. Brown, 853 
P.2d 851 (Utah 1992) . The majority reaches its conclusion by 
3
 In State v. Rawlings, 829 P.2d 150, 154 (Utah Ct. App. 
1992), the court of appeals stated, *When resentencing takes 
place to allow a first appeal of right, as set forth in Johnson, 
this should not rule out the procedural possibility that post-
conviction motions may be appropriately heard in the sentencing 
court." Insofar as Rawlings departs from our analysis here and 
in Hallett, it is disavowed. 
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reasoning that Brown should not be applied retroactively. I 
submit that the majority ignores precedent from both this Court 
and the United States Supreme Court that mandates reversal 
notwithstanding the issue of whether Brown itself should have 
retroactive effect. Brown was based on this Court's supervisory 
authority, but that case nevertheless implicated a defendant's 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Regardless of whether the 
specific holding in Brown is applicable, the Sixth Amendment 
issue is raised whenever a defendant's attorney has a conflict of 
interest; yet the majority barely discusses it. I also disagree 
with the majority's conclusion that the holding in Brown is 
unavailing to Gordon. Because the issues underlying Brown are of 
a constitutional nature, the Supreme Court's holding in Griffith 
v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 328 (1987), requires this Court to 
follow the federal rule applying all judicial decisions 
retroactively. I would therefore hold that the judgment must be 
reversed. 
I. VIOLATION OF THE SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO COUNSEL 
Whether our decision in Brown should apply 
retroactively is irrelevant to the central issue in this case. 
At the time of Gordon's and Brown's trials, this Court and the 
United States Supreme Court had already treated the issue of the 
impact of serious conflicts of interest upon a defendant's Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel and due process. Those decisions thus 
constituted established precedent before Gordon ever came to 
trial. In State v. Brown, 853 P.2d 851, 856-57 (Utah 1992), we 
chose not to address these constitutional issues. It is 
nevertheless clear that the Constitution is implicated in 
situations where defense counsel are also part-time prosecutors. 
Hence, if the majority here wishes to conclude that Gordon's 
trial was not constitutionally flawed, it cannot simply rely on 
the proposition that Brown is inapplicable because it was based 
on our so-called supervisory power rather than on the 
constitutional right to counsel itself. The Court must show that 
the Sixth Amendment and Due Process Clauses were not violated in 
this case, or that if they were violated the error is somehow 
harmless. Yet the majority opinion accords only the most cursory 
treatment to these unavoidable constitutional issues. 
In doing so, the majority opinion notes, *We had the 
clear opportunity to enunciate such a [constitutional] holding in 
Brown but expressly refused to do so." This is true. In Brown 
we merely followed the principle that constitutional issues ought 
to be avoided when another basis for decision is available. 
Because we reversed Brown's conviction on that other basis, 
constitutional analysis became superfluous—not because it was 
not pertinent to the issues raised, but because it could not 
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influence the outcome. In this case, however, where the majority 
claims it can find no state law ground for reversal, the federal 
issues must, in that event, be addressed. The purported absence 
of a state law ground for decision does not make the federal 
ground magically disappear. 
Before either Brown or Gordon came to trial, it was 
well established that *the assistance of counsel is among those 
^constitutional rights so basic to a fair trial that their 
infraction can never be treated as harmless error.'" Holloway v. 
Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 489 (1978) (quoting Chapman v. 
California, 386 U.S. 18, 23 (1967)). In that regard, the United 
States Supreme Court has held that where there is an 
unconstitutional conflict of interest, it will not ^indulge in 
nice calculations as to the amount of prejudice arising from [the 
resulting] denial [of the assistance of counsel]." Glasser v. 
United States, 315 U.S. 60, 76 (1942); see Cuyler v. Sullivan, 
446 U.S. 335, 348-50 (1980); Holloway, 435 U.S. at 490; see also 
Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261, 271-72 (1981) (holding same on due 
process grounds). Rather, prejudice will be presumed and the 
judgment reversed. This Court rendered the same holding and 
adopted the same rule in State v. Smith, 621 P.2d 697, 699 (Utah 
1980). In that case, one attorney represented two codefendants. 
One codefendant elected to plead guilty and testify against the 
other. Relying on Holloway, this Court held that such a conflict 
of interest required a per se reversal of Smith's conviction. 
Id. 
Because Glasser and much of its progeny were cases in 
which the conflict of interest arose out of joint representation 
of multiple defendants and because such joint representation may 
actually be appropriate in certain cases, Holloway, 435 U.S. at 
482-83 (stating that "certain advantages might accrue from joint 
representation"), the Supreme Court has required the factual 
predicate of an objection to a conflict of interest before the 
per se reversal rule may be invoked: "[A] defendant who raised 
no objection [to the conflict of interest] at trial must 
demonstrate that an actual conflict of interest adversely 
affected his lawyer's performance." Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 348.* 
1
 Prior to Cuyler, this Court held in Smith, "*The law will 
not assume that counsel has advised his client of his 
inadequacies or those of his associates.'" 621 P.2d at 699 
(quoting Commonwealth v. Via, 316 A.2d 895, 898 (Pa. 1974)). 
Gordon was not informed of his attorney's conflict of interest 
and had no reason to suspect it. Arguably then, notwithstanding 
Cuyler, Gordon is entitled to application of the more lenient 
(Footnote continued on the next page.) 
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In reference to the facts of Gordon's case, however, it is clear 
that it has never been appropriate for an appointed defense 
attorney to simultaneously function as a part-time city 
prosecutor.2 Brown established that "it is clear that conflicts 
of interest inhere whenever a city prosecutor is appointed to 
represent an indigent defendant."3 853 P.2d at 858; see also 
People v. Washington, 461 N.E.2d 393, 395-97 (111.) (applying per 
se reversal rule in case where part-time prosecutor acted as 
defense counsel), cert, denied, 469 U.S. 1022 (1984).4 Yet the 
1
 (Footnote continued.) 
Holloway rule because he had no plausible reason for suspecting 
his attorney's conflict, whereas, in the Cuyler line of cases, 
the conflict was reasonably apparent even to the individual 
defendants. 
2
 The majority asserts that Brown was prophylactic in 
nature. A reading of that case, however, admits no such 
interpretation. The language proscribing the dual role of 
prosecutor and defender in Brown unequivocally asserts that the 
"vital interests of the criminal justice system are jeopardized 
when a city prosecutor is appointed to assist in the defense of 
an accused." Brown, 853 P.2d at 856-57. If, as the majority now 
claims, retroactive application of Brown "would unjustly benefit 
many defendants," then it is difficult to understand why we 
elected in Brown to impose such a harsh consequence on appeal for 
conflicts of interest involving part-time prosecutors serving as 
defense counsel. 
3
 It should be noted that this particular point essentially 
served as a factual basis for this Court's legal conclusion 
setting forth the consequences of the self-evident conflict. 
Even assuming that the legal consequences of Brown (i.e., a per 
se reversal based on supervisory authority) are not 
"retroactively" applicable to Gordon's case, we are certainly 
entitled to rely on Brown as evidence establishing the factual 
predicate for a per se reversal pursuant to the constitutional 
grounds set forth in Glasser and its progeny. 
4
 It must be conceded that there is contra authority in 
other jurisdictions. Mitchell v. Maggio, 679 F.2d 77, 79-80 (5th 
Cir.), cert, denied, 459 U.S. 912 (1982), held without any 
supporting citations that the Sixth Amendment does not require a 
per se reversal when a part-time city prosecutor acts as a 
defense attorney. The same circuit recently limited the 
applicability of the per se reversal rule to situations involving 
"multiple representation" despite a complete lack of any textual 
(Footnote continued on the next page.) 
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majority persists in asserting that the potential for prejudice 
arising from a conflict when ^defense counsel . . . has 
concurrent prosecutorial duties . . . is much more remote'' than 
the potential for prejudice arising out of a conflict due to 
*joint representation of multiple defendants." This assertion is 
supremely ironic because now under the law in Utah, concurrent 
representation of codefendants is permitted in appropriate 
circumstances, see Holloway, 435 U.S. at 482-83, while under no 
circumstances may a part-time prosecutor represent any criminal 
defendant anywhere. If Brown established anything, it is the 
principle that the factual predicate of an actual conflict of 
interest is always present when a part-time prosecutor acts as a 
defense attorney. Brown, 853 P.2d at 856-57, 859. A logical 
constitutional analysis requires that Gordon's conviction be 
reversed. 
II. APPLICABILITY OF RETROACTIVITY ANALYSIS 
The majority also fails to recognize that Brown is 
applicable to this case even under retroactivity analysis. 
Because Brown could have been decided on federal constitutional 
grounds, this Court is bound by the United States Supreme Court's 
decision in Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 328 (1987), which 
unequivocally held that "a new rule for the conduct of criminal 
prosecutions is to be applied retroactively to all cases, state 
or federal, pending on direct review or not yet final, with no 
exception for cases in which the new rule constitutes a *clear 
break' with the past." Id. (emphasis added). "The Supremacy 
Clause . . . does not allow federal retroactivity doctrine to be 
supplanted by the invocation of a contrary approach to 
4
 (Footnote continued.) 
evidence that the Supreme Court intended to impose such a 
limitation. Beets v. Scott, 65 F.3d 1258, 1272 (5th Cir. 1995). 
The Iowa Court of Appeals in Bumgardner v, State, 401 N.W.2d 211, 
213-14 (Iowa Ct. App. 1986), also declined to adopt a per se rule 
under the part-time prosecutor fact pattern. Bumgardner, 
however, virtually ignores pertinent constitutional authority in 
favor of policy reasoning avoiding the disqualification of all 
part-time prosecutors in rural counties where it would be 
difficult to appoint a defense attorney who did not have such a 
conflict of interest. In light of our holding in Brown, we can 
hardly employ similar policy reasoning in this case. 
15 No. 940558 
retroactivity under state law."5 Harper v. Virginia Dep't of 
Taxation, 113 S. Ct. 2510, 2519 (1993). 
The majority attempts to circumvent this mandate by 
noting that Brown was expressly based on our "supervisory power" 
and holding that when we invoke that power, "it is a clear 
indication that the decision will apply only to future cases."6 
Yet, as I have already pointed out, our choice of that analytical 
path cannot eliminate the underlying constitutional concerns. 
Under the majority's analysis, any time we face a constitutional 
issue, we can simply assert our supervisory authority as an 
alternate basis for decision and thereby render the ruling in 
Griffith a nullity when it comes time to address the 
retroactivity of the underlying case. Although Harper 
5
 The majority claims that "even where we have adopted a new 
rule that is of constitutional dimension, we have been reluctant 
to give it retroactive effect." This assertion is incorrect. 
"In the vast majority of cases, the stated law of a decision is 
effective both prospectively and retrospectively, even a decision 
which overrules prior law. Therefore, unless a substantial 
injustice would occur from retrospective application, we will 
apply a decision both prospectively and retrospectively." Heslop 
v. Bank of Utah, 839 P.2d 828, 835 (Utah 1992). In any event, 
Griffith and Harper make clear that we are not at liberty to be 
"reluctant" when it comes to affording retroactive effect to 
decisions of a "constitutional dimension." 
6
 The majority here misconstrues our prior precedent. For 
support, the majority relies upon dicta contained in a footnote 
in State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 406-07 n.7 (Utah 1994). The 
Menzies majority, responding to my dissent in that case, briefly 
treated the issue of whether the holdings in State v. Johnson, 
774 P.2d 1141, 1147-48 (Utah 1989) (Stewart, J., concurring in 
the result, joined by Zimmerman and Durham, JJ.) (invalidating 
inappropriate language in a jury instruction), and State v. 
Ireland, 773 P.2d 1375, 1380 (Utah 1989) (same), applied 
retroactively. The Menzies majority, apparently relying in part 
on the fact that the stated authority underlying Johnson and 
Ireland was our supervisory power, asserted that their holding 
applied only prospectively. That is nonetheless a far cry from 
holding that all decisions grounded in our so-called supervisory 
power—whatever that means apart from our appellate power—are 
ineligible for the retroactive application that is traditionally 
accorded to judicial decisions. State v. Norton, 675 P.2d 577, 
583 (Utah 1983), overruled on other grounds, State v. Hansen, 734 
P.2d 421, 427 (Utah 1986); see also Heslop, 839 P.2d at 835; 
Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 661, 676 (Utah 1984). 
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acknowledged the availability of differing retroactivity analysis 
on purely state law grounds, 113 S. Ct. at 2519, I doubt 
seriously that the United States Supreme Court would permit the 
majorityfs subterfuge if a case such as Gordon's were brought 
before it on a writ of certiorari. The holding in Brown provides 
neither an independent nor an adequate state law ground for 
ignoring the requirements of Griffith. Harper, 113 S. Ct. at 
2518-19. 
Likewise, the majority's holding that Brown falls 
within one of the exceptions to the general rule of retroactivity 
that a "new rule governing criminal procedure [which] constitutes 
a clear break with the past" is also explicitly barred by 
Griffith. 479 U.S. at 328. And even if we were at liberty to 
apply it, the policy reason behind it—refraining from punishing 
prosecutors post facto for violating procedural rules that were 
not in force at the time of trial—would not be present.7 Brown 
did not establish a procedural rule constituting a clear break 
with the past. It merely dictated the consequences on appeal of 
a conflict of interest occurring in the trial court. Because it 
would have been prudent and reasonable to assume, even prior to 
Brown, that the appointment of defense counsel who was also a 
part-time city prosecutor within the same county could constitute 
an impermissible conflict of interest, Brown did not create any 
new procedural rules. If anything, given the available precedent 
which I have already discussed, courts should have been on notice 
that such a conflict could result in precisely the consequence 
ultimately dictated by Brown. 
In sum, I submit that defendant is entitled to a 
reversal of his conviction and a new trial. 
Justice Durham concurs in Associate Chief Justice 
Stewart's dissenting opinion. 
7
 The majority argues that applying the rule in Brown to 
this case will harm the "efficient administration of justice." I 
disagree. Giving Gordon the benefit of this Court's ruling in 
Brown will cause no disruption of any significance in the 
criminal justice system. If there be other defendants who are 
incarcerated as a result of trials in which they were represented 
by part-time city prosecutors, their cases would have to come 
before the courts on writs of habeas corpus, and the rules of law 
that would apply under those circumstances are entirely different 
from the rule that should prevail here. 
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